Lightning-Fast and Privacy-Preserving Outsourced Computation in the
  Cloud by Liu, Ximeng et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
12
54
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 S
ep
 20
19
1
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Ximeng Liu Member, IEEE, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE, Pengfei Wu, Student Member, IEEE, Yang
Yang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a framework for lightning-fast privacy-preserving outsourced computation framework in the
cloud, which we refer to as LightCom. Using LightCom, a user can securely achieve the outsource data storage and fast secure
data processing in a single cloud server different from the existing multi-server outsourced computation model. Specifically, we first
present a general secure computation framework for LightCom under the cloud server equipped with multiple Trusted Processing Units
(TPUs) which face the side-channel attack. Under the LightCom, we design two specified fast processing toolkits which allow the user
to achieve the commonly-used secure integer computation and secure floating-point computation against the side-channel information
leakage of TPUs, respectively. Furthermore, our LightCom can also guarantee access pattern protection during the data processing
and achieve user private information retrieve after the computation. We prove that the proposed LightCom can successfully achieve the
goal of single cloud outsourced data processing to avoid the extra computation server and trusted computation server, and demonstrate
the utility and the efficiency of LightCom using simulations.
Index Terms—Privacy-Preserving; Secure Outsourced Computation; Homomorphic Encryption; Secret Sharing Technique; Against
Side-channel Attack.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
THE internet of things (IoT), embedded with elec-tronics, Internet connectivity, and other forms of
hardware (such as sensors), is a computing concept that
describes the idea of everyday physical objects being
connected to the internet and being able to identify
themselves to other devices. With large numbers of IoT
devices, huge amount of data are generated for usage.
According to IDC1, the connect IoT devices will reach
80 billion in 2025, and help to generate 180 trillion
gigabytes of new data that year. A quarter of the data
will create in real time, and 95% is to come from IoT
real time data. With such large volume real-time data
are generated, it is impossible for the resource-limited
IoT devices to store and do the data analytics in time.
Cloud computing, equipped almost unlimited power of
storage and computing, provides diversity of services
on demand, such as, storage, databases, networking,
software, analytics, intelligence. With the help of cloud
computing, 49 percent of data will be stored in public
cloud environments by 2025 2. Thus, it is unsurprisingly
that the huge volume data generated by IoT devices
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are outsourced to the cloud for long-term storage and
achieve real-time online processing.
Despite the advantages provided by IoT-cloud data
outsourcing architecture, the individual IoT users are
hesitated to the system for data storage and processing
without any protection method. In the Internet of Med-
ical Things example [1], patients’ wearable mHealth de-
vices that always equipped with the biometric measure-
ments sensors (such as heart rate, perspiration levels,
oxygen levels) to record the physical sign of the patient.
The hospital can use clients PHI decision-making model
to automatically check a patients health status. If no
protection method is adopted, patients’s physical sign
can be capture by adversary. Moreover, the hospital
model can be got by other third-party company to
make profit. Use the traditional encryption technique can
protect the data from leakage, however, the ciphertext
lost the original meaning of the plaintext which cannot
doing any computations.
Protecting the data and achieve the secure outsource
computation simultaneously is an eye-catching field to
solve the above problems. Currently, there are typically
two aspects of techniques to achieve secure outsourced
computation: theoretical cryptography solution and sys-
tem security solution. For the cryptography point of
view, homomorphic encryption [2] is considered as a
super-excellent solution for the outsourced computation
which allows the third-party to perform the computation
on the encrypted data without reveal the content of the
plaintext. Fully homomorphic encryption [3] can achieve
arbitrary computation on the plaintext corresponding
to the complex operations on ciphertext. However, the
computation overhead is still tremendous which is not
2fit for the piratical usage (e.g., it requires 29.5 s to
run secure integer multiplication computation with a
common PC [4]). Semi-homomorphic encryption [5], [6]
only supports one types of homomorphic (e.g. additive
homomorphic), can achieve complex data computation
on the encrypted data with the help of extra honest-but-
curious servers. But, the extra computation server will
increase possibility of the information leakage. Recently,
for the industrial community, trusted execution environ-
ment (TEE, such as Intelr Software Guard Extensions
(SGX)3 and ARM TrustZone4) is developed to achieve the
secure computation which allows user-level or operating
system code to define private regions of memory, also
called enclaves. The data in the enclave are protected
and unable to be either read or saved by any process
outside the enclave itself. The performance of the TEE
is equivalent to the plaintext computation overhead.
Unfortunately, TEE easily faces the side-channel attack,
and the information inside the enclave can be leaked to
the adversary5 6. Thus, an fascinating problem appears
for creating a system to balance the usage of practical
outsourced computation system and eliminate the extra
information leakage risk: how can a single cloud securely
perform the arbitrary outsourced computation without the help
of extra third-party computation server or trusted authority,
which interactions between the user and the cloud kept to a
minimum.
In this paper, we seek to address the above-mentioned
challenge by presenting a framework for lightning-fast
and privacy-preserving outsourced computation Frame-
work in a Cloud (LightCom). We regard the contribu-
tions of this paper to be six-fold, namely:
• Secure Data Outsourced Storage. The LightCom allows
each user to outsource his/her individual data to a
cloud data center for secure storage without com-
promising the privacy of his/her own data to the
other unauthorized storage.
• Lightning-fast and Secure Data Processing in Single
Cloud. The LightCom can allow in a single cloud
equipped with multiple Trusted Processing Units
(TPUs), which provides a TEE to achieve the user-
centric outsourced computation on the user’s en-
crypted data. Moreover, the data in outside un-
trusted storage are secure against chosen ciphertext
attack for long-term, while data insider TPUs can be
protected against side-channel attack.
• Outsourced Computation Primitive Combinable. Cur-
rently, the outsourced computation methods fo-
cus on a special computation task, such as out-
sourced exponential computation. Different spe-
cific outsourced tasks are constructed with different
crypto preliminary. Thus, the previous computation
3. https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx
4. https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/security-ip/trustzone
5. https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sgx-and-side-
channels
6. https://www.arm.com/products/silicon-ip-security/side-
channel-mitigation
result cannot be directly used for the input of the
next computation. Our LightCom can directly solve
the problem with uniform design method which can
achieve computation combinable.
• No Trusted Authority Involved. In most of the exist-
ing cryptosystem, trusted authority is fully trusted
which is an essential party in charge of distributing
the public/private keys for all the other parties
in the system. Our LightCom does not involve an
additional fully trusted party in the system which
makes the system more efficient and practical.
• Dynamic Key/Ciphertext Shares Update. To reduce the
user’s private key and data leakage risk during the
processing, our LightCom randomly splits the key
and data into different shares which are processed
in different TPUs, cooperatively. To avoid long-term
shares leaking for recovering the original secrets,
our LightCom allows TPUs updating user’s “old”
data/private-key shares into the “new” shares on-
the-fly dynamically without the participation of the
data user.
• High User Experience. Most existing privacy-
preserving computation technique requires user
to preform different pre-processing technique
according the function type prior to data
outsourcing. The LightCom does not need the data
owner to perform any pre-processing procedure -
only needs to encrypt and outsource the data to
the cloud for storage. Thus, interactions between
the user and the cloud kept to a minimum - send
the encrypted data to the cloud, and received
outsourced computed results in a single round.
Motivation and Technique Overview. As the sensitive
information contained inside TPU can be attacked, our
primary goal of the LightCom framework is to achieve
secure computation in a single cloud without the help
of an additional party. The idea is to let the data store
in the outside storage, and achieve privacy-preserving
computation insider TPU. The main challenges are how
to achieve both secure data storage and data processing
against side-channel attacks, simultaneously. To solve the
previous challenge, we use a new Paillier Cryptosys-
tem Distributed Decryption (PCDD) which can achieve
semantic secure data storage. To prevent information
leakage inside TPU, our LightCom uses one-time pad
by adding some random numbers on plaintext of the
PCDD ciphertext. Even the “padded” ciphertext for
TPU enclave for decryption and process, the attacker
still cannot get the original message of the plaintext.
To achieve ciphertext decryption, our LightCom uses
multiple TPUs, and each TPU only stores a share of
the private key to prevent the user’s key leakage risk.
Even some partial private key/data shares may leak to
the adversary; our framework can successfully update
these shares dynamically inside the TPU to make the
leaked shares useless. More importantly, all the secure
execution environment (called TPU enclaves) in TPUs
3are dynamically building and release for the secure
computation in our LightCom framework, which can
further decrease the information leak risk in the enclave.
2 PRELIMINARY
2.1 Notations
Throughout the paper, we use ‖x‖ to denote bit-length
of x, while L(x) denotes the number of element in x.
Moreover, we use pka and ska to denote the public and
private keys of a Request User (RU) a, sk
(1)
a , sk
(2)
a to
denote the partial private keys that form ska, [[x]]pka
to denote the encrypted data of x using pka in public-
key cryptosystem. For simplicity, if all ciphertexts belong
to a specific RU, say a, we simply use [[x]] instead of
[[x]]pka . We use notion 〈m〉 to denote the data share of
m, i.e., each party i (i = 1, · · · ,P) holds mi, such that∑P
i=1mi = m.
2.2 Additive Secret Sharing Scheme (ASS)
Give m ∈ G (G is a finite abelian group under addition),
the additive secret sharing scheme (a.k.a. P-out-of-P se-
cret sharing scheme) can be classified into the following
two algorithms – Data Share Algorithm (Share) and
Data Recovery Algorithm (Rec):
Share(m) : Randomly generate X1, · · · , XP−1 ∈ G,
the algorithm computes XP = m − (X1 + · · · + XP−1),
and outputs X1, · · · , XP .
Rec(X1, · · · , XP) : With the shares X1, · · · , XP , the
algorithm can recover the messagem by computing with
m = X1 + · · ·+XP under group G.
2.3 Additive Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
To reduce the communication cost of the LightCom,
we used an Additive Homomorphic Encryption (AHE)
scheme as the basis. Specifically, we use one of the AHE
support threshold decryption called Paillier Cryptosys-
tem Distributed Decryption (PCDD) in our previous
work which contains six algorithms called Key Genera-
tion (KeyGen), Data Encryption (Enc), Data Decryption
(Dec), Private Key Splitting (KeyS), Partially decryption
(PDec), Threshold decryption (TDec). The plaintext is
belonged to ZN and the ciphertext is belonged to ZN2 .
The construction of the above algorithms can be found in
Supplementary Materials Section C. Here, we introduce
the two properties of the PCDD as follows: 1) Additive
Homomorphism: Given ciphertexts [[m1]] and [[m2]] under
a same public key pk, the additive homomorphism can
be computed by ciphertext multiplication, i.e., compute
[[m1]] · [[m2]] = [[m1 + m2]]. 2) Scalar-multiplicative Homo-
morphism: Given ciphertext [[m]] and a constant number
c ∈ ZN , it has ([[m]])c = [[cm]].
With the two properties given above, we show that our
PCDD have the polynomial homomorphism property,
i.e., given [[x1]], · · · , [[xn]] and a1, · · · , an, it has
[[a1 · x1 + a2 · x2 + · · · anxn]] ← [[x1]]a1 · [[x2]]a2 · · · [[xn]]an .
2.4 Mathematical Function Computation
In this section, we define the function which is used for
data processing in our LightCom.
Definition 1 (Deterministic Multiple-output Multivari-
able Functions). Let D = {(x1, · · · , xv) : xi ∈ G} be
a subset of Gv. We define the deterministic multiple-output
multivariable function as follows: (I) A multiple-output mul-
tivariable function F of v variables is a rule which assigns
each ordered vector (x1, · · · , xv) in D to a unique vector
denoted (y1, · · · , yw), denote (y1, · · · , yw) ← F(x1, · · · , xv).
(II) The set D is called the domain of F . (III) The set
{F(x1, · · · , xv)|(x1, · · · , xv) ∈ D} is called the range of F .
Note that the deterministic multiple-output multivari-
able function is the general case of the deterministic
multiple-output single-variable function (v = 1), deter-
ministic single-output multivariable function (w = 1),
and deterministic single-output single variable function
(v = 1, w = 1). As all the functions used in our paper can
be successfully executed by a polynomial deterministic
Turing machine (See Supplementary materials Section
A), we omit the word “deterministic” in the rest of the
paper.
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Fig. 1. System model under consideration
3 SYSTEM MODEL & PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
In this section, we formalize the LightCom system
model, and define the attack model.
3.1 System Model
In our LightCom system, we mainly focus on how the
cloud server responds to a user request on outsourced
computation in a privacy-preserving manner. The sys-
tem comprises Request User (RU) and a Cloud with
Untrusted Storage (UnS) and Trusted Processing Units
(TPUs) - see Fig. 1.
• A RU generates his/her public key, private key
shares, and data shares. After that, the RU can
securely outsource the public key and private/data
shares to the clouds UnS for secure storage (See
1©). Moreover, the RU can also request a cloud to
perform some secure outsourced computations on
the outsourced data, and securely retrieve the final
encrypted results (See 5©).
• A UnS of the cloud has ‘unlimited’ data storage
space to store and manage data outsourced from
4the registered RU. Also, the UnS also stores all
the intermediate and final results for the RU in
encrypted form.
• The TPUs of the cloud provides online computation
ability for each RUs. Each TPU provides isolation
secure computing environment for individual RU
and can load RU’s data shares from UnS (See 2©),
perform certain calculations over the data shares
(See 3©), and then securely seal the data shares in
UnS for storage (See 4©)7. Note that one TPU cannot
load other TPU’s sealed data which are stored in
UnS.
3.2 Attack Model
In our attack model, the cloud is curious-but-honest party,
which strictly follow the protocol, but are also interested
in learning data belonged to the RUs. The UnS inside
the cloud is transparency to both the cloud and the
outsider passive attackers. Every TPU can provide a
secure execution environment (a.k.a., TPU enclave) for
a RU which is secure against the other RU, the cloud
and outsider passive attackers. The inside non-challenge
RUs and outside attackers can also be interested to
learn challenge RU’s data. Therefore, we introduce three
active adversaries A∗1,A
∗
2,A
∗
3, which can simulate the
malicious actions corresponding to the outside attackers,
non-challenge RUs, UnS, respectively. The goal of these
adversaries is to get the challenge RU’s plaintext or try
to let the challenge RU get wrong computation result
with the following capabilities:
1) A∗1 acts as the outside attacker that may eavesdrop
on all communication links and CP’s UnS, and try to
decrypt the challenge RU’s encrypted data. 2) A∗2 may
compromise RUs, with the exception of the challenge RU,
to get access to their decryption capabilities, and try to
guess all plaintexts belonging to the challenge RU. 3)
A∗3 may compromise the TPU to guess plaintext values
of all data shares sent from the UnS by executing an
interactive protocol. Noting that the above adversaries
A∗1,A
∗
2,A
∗
3 are restricted from compromising (i) all the
TPUs concurrently8, and (ii) the challenge RU.
4 BASIC PRIVACY PRESERVING COMPUTA-
TION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we introduce our general design method
of the mathematical function for LightCom. Moreover,
the dynamic private/data share update without the par-
ticipation of the DO are also introduced.
4.1 The LightCom Design Method for the Single
Functions
Our LightCom achieves the user data’s privacy dur-
ing the efficiency in the outsourced cloud with three-
7. See the algorithm Seal and UnSeal in Section 5.4.
8. Note that P ≥ 3 TPUs are required in LightCom for the security
consideration.
dimensional protection: 1) secure storing in the un-
trusted cloud storage; 2) secure processing in TPUs
against side-channel attack; 3) efficient and dynamic
outsourced key and data shares updating. Specifically, to
outsource the data to the cloud, the RU first initializes
the system, uses the RU’s public key to encrypt the
data and outsource these encryptions along with the
system parameters to UnS for storage. To achieve the
second-dimensional protection, our LightCom uses the
data sharing-based secure computation method between
TPUs which can resist the side-channel attacks even
the PPCD ciphertexts are decrypted. After finishing the
processing, the data are sent back to UnS for further
processing to finish the corresponding functionality de-
fined in the program, and the enclaves in TPUs are
released. Moreover, to tackle the leaked private key and
data shares, all the TPUs can jointly update these shares
without the help of RU. Thus, the LightCom can classify
into the following four phases.
1) System Initialize Phase: Firstly, the RU generates a
public key pk and private key is sk of appropriate public
key crypto-system, and then splits the private key sk into
P shares ski (i = 1, · · · ,P) with the Share algorithm.
After that, for each TPU i in the cloud, it initials an
enclave i, builds a secure channel, and uploads the ski
to the enclave i securely. Finally, the TPU i uses the data
sealing to securely stored the pk, ski in to UnS.
2) Data Upload Phase: In the phase, the RU randomly
separate the data xj,1, · · · , xj,P ∈ G, such that xj,1 +
· · · + xj,P = xj for j = 1, · · · , v. Then, the TPU i
(i = 1, · · · ,P) creates the enclave i. After that, the RU
defines the program Ci for some specific computation
function, builds a secure channel with TPU enclave i,
remotely loads x1,i, · · · , xv,i, Ci into the enclave i, and
securely seals x1,i, · · · , xv,i, Ci in the UnS. After that, TPU
i release enclaves i for all the i = 1, · · · ,P .
3) Secure Computation Phase: The goal of the phase
is to achieve the secure computation among the TPUs
according to the user-defined program Ci. Thus, it works
as follows:
• (3-I) Each TPU i generates an enclave i. After that,
all the TPUs build a secure channel with each other.
Load sealed data x1,i, · · · , xv,i, pk, ski, Ci to enclave
i from UnS, and denote them as Si.
• (3-II) TPUs jointly compute (y1,1, · · · , yw,1 : · · · :
y1,P , · · · , yw,P) ← GenCpt(S1 : · · · : SP) according
to the user-defined program C1, · · · , CP . 9
• (3-III) All the TPUs jointly update the private key
shares and data shares dynamically.
After the above computation, the TPU i seals
y1,i, · · · , yw,i into the UnS, and releases the enclave.
4) Data Retrive Phase: If the RU needs to retrieve the
computation results from the cloud, the TPU i creates
an enclave i, opens the sealed data y1,i, · · · , yw,i, builds
a secure channel with the RU, and sends the data shares
9. The construction of General Secure Function Computation Algo-
rithm (GenCpt) can be found in section 4.3.
5back to RU. Once all the shares are sends to RU, the RU
computes yj =
∑P
i=1 yj,i for j = 1, · · · , w.
4.2 The LightCom Design for Combination of the
Functions
Our LightCom can support for single data outsourced
with multiple function operations. The procedure is as
follows:
1) System Initialize Phase: Same to the LightCom with
single function in Section 4.1.
2) Data Upload Phase: After the system initialize phase,
the RU defines the program Ci,t for TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P)
with function computation step t (t = 1, · · · , ζ) and
randomly separates the data xj,1,1, · · · , xj,1,P , such that
xj,1,1+ · · ·+xj,1,P = xj for j = 1, · · · , v 10. After that, the
RU builds a secure channel with TPU enclave i, remotely
loads C1,i, · · · , Cζ,i, x1,1,i, · · · , xv,1,i into the enclave i, and
securely seals these data in the UnS. After that, TPU i
release enclaves i for all the i = 1, · · · ,P .
3) Secure Computation Phase: The goal of the phase
is to achieve the secure computation among the TPUs
according to the user-defined program Ct,i for function t
(t = 1, · · · , ζ). Thus, for each step t, the phase works as
follows:
• (3-I) Each TPU i generates an enclave i. After
that, all the TPUs build a secure channel with
each other. Load sealed data x1,t,i, · · · , xv,t,i, pk, ski,
C1,i, · · · , Cζ,i to enclave i from UnS, and put them in
a set Et,i.
• (3-II) TPUs jointly compute (y1,t,1, · · · , yw,t,1 : · · · :
y1,t,n, · · · , yw,t,P) ← GenCpt(Et,i : · · · : Et,i), accord-
ing to the user-defined program C1,i, · · · , Cζ,i.
• (3-III) All the TPUs jointly update the private
key and data shares. If t = ζ, the TPU i seals
y1,ζ,i, · · · , yw,ζ,i into the UnS, release the enclave.
Otherwise, move to (3-IV) for further computation.
• (3-IV) Select x1,t+1,i, · · · , xv,t+1,i from the
y1,t,i, · · · , yw,t,i for TPU i. Then, the TPU i
seals x1,t+1,i, · · · , xv,t+1,i into the UnS, release
the enclave, and move to (3-I) for next step
computation.
After the t step is finished, the TPU i seals the set Ej into
the UnS, and releases the corresponding enclave.
4) Data Retrieve Phase: After the computation, TPU i
new an enclave i, opens the sealed data y1,ζ,i, · · · , yw,ζ,i,
builds a secure channel with the RU, and sends these
data back to the RU. Once all the TPU’s data are sent,
the RU computes the result yj,ζ =
∑P
i=1 yj,ζ,i for step ζ
(j = 1, · · · , w) to get the final results.
4.3 General Secure Function Computation Algo-
rithm (GenCpt)
As the key component of the LightCom, the General
Secure Function Computation Algorithm (GenCpt) are
10. Data share xj,t,i is for TPU enclave i for data j of function
computation step-t.
proposed to achieve the secure deterministic multiple-
output multivariable function F computation which
is introduced in definition 1. Assume TPU i (i =
1, · · · ,P) holds x1,i, · · · , xv,i, GenCpt can securely out-
put y1,i, · · · , yw,i for each TPU i, such that (y1, · · · , yw)←
F(x1, · · · , xv), where xj,1+ · · ·+xj,P = xj and yk,1+ · · ·+
yk,P = yk for j = 1, · · · , v; k = 1, · · · , w. The GenCpt can
be classified into offline/online stages and constructed
as follows:
Offline Stage: Each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) creates an
enclave i, loads the sealed keys pk, ski and program Ci
into the enclave from the UnS, builds a secure channel
with the other TPUs.11 With the help of homomorphic
public key cryptosystem, all the TPUs collaboratively
generate the shares of random numbers and put them
into a set Ri. Note the shares in set Ri cannot be known
by all the other TPUs during the generation. After the
above computation, each TPU i seals theRi into the UnS,
respectively.
Online Stage12. For each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P), loads
the sealed random numbers setRi from offline stage into
the enclave i. All the TPUs cooperatively compute and
output the results
(y1,i, · · · , yw,i) ← fi(x1,i, · · · , xv,i,Ri),
where fi is the combination of +,× for ZN and ⊕,∧ for
Z2 with specific functionality according to the program
Ci.
4.4 Private Key Share Update against Side-Channel
Attack
The private key shares are more sensitive and vulnera-
ble, as the adversary can use the private key to decrypt
the RU’s data in the untrusted storage if all shares
of the private key are leaked by side channel attack.
Thus, we should frequently update the key shares in
the TPU enclave. The intuitive idea is to let the RU
choose a new private key, separate the new private key
into different key shares, update these key shares in
the different individual enclaves, and update all the ci-
phertext with the new key. However, the above strategy
has the main drawback: the RU has to be involved in
the private/public key update phase which brings extra
computation and communication cost. Thus, in this case,
the RU needs to generate and update the public/private
keys frequently which is impractical. Thus, we bring
the idea of proactive secret sharing into the LightCom:
keeps the public/private key unchanged, the TPU will
periodicity refresh the key shares without the participa-
tion of the RU. Mathematically, to renew the shares at
period t (t = 0, 1, 2, · · · ), we need to update the shares
such that
∑P
i=1 sk
(t+1)
i =
∑P
i=1 sk
(t)
i +
∑P
i=1
∑P
j=1 δ
(t)
i,j ,
11. As offline stage of the secure computations needs to do TPU
enclave initialization, we just omit the description in the rest of the
section.
12. The input data x1,i, · · · , xv,i,, public key pk, private key shares
ski, and the program Ci are loaded in the step of (3-I) of both section
4.1 and 4.2
6where
∑P
j=1 δi,j = 0,
∑P
i=1 sk
(0)
i = sk and sk
(0)
i = ski
for i = 1, · · · ,P (See Fig. 2 for example of private key
update procedure with P = 3). The special construction
is as follows:
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Fig. 2. Key Shares Update (example of P = 3)
1) Each TPU i(i = 1, · · · ,P) creates an enclave i. After
that, TPU i the builds a secure channel with TPU j’s
enclave (j = 1, · · · ,P ; j 6= i).
2) TPU i picks random numbers δi,1, · · · , δi,P ∈ G such
that δi,1+· · ·+δi,P = 0 under the groupG, and then sends
δi,j to TPU enclave j.
3) After received δj,i, TPU i computes the new shares
sk
(t+1)
i ← sk
(t)
i + δ
(t)
1,i + δ
(t)
2,i + · · · + δ
(t)
P,i ∈ G. After that,
TPU i erases all the variables which it used, except for
its current secret key sk
(t+1)
i .
4.5 Data Shares Update against Side-Channel At-
tack
As data shares need to load to TPU for process-
ing, the shares can be leaked to the adversary by
side channel attack, and reconstruct the RU’s original
data. Thus, we also need to dynamically update data
shares x
(t)
1 , · · · , x
(t)
P at period t (t = 0, 1, 2, · · · ), such
that
∑P
i=1 x
(t+1)
i =
∑P
i=1 x
(t)
i +
∑P
i=1
∑P
j=1 δi,j , where∑P
i=1 x
(0)
i = x, x
(0)
i = xi, and
∑P
j=1 δi,j = 0 for
i = 1, · · · ,P . The construction is same to the private key
share update method in section 4.4.
5 TPU-BASED BASIC DATA SHARES OPERA-
TIONS
In this section, we introduce some basic TPU-based data
shares operations which can be used as the basis of
LightCom.
5.1 Data Domain and Storage Format
Here, we introduce three the data group domain
for LightCom: ZN = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, DN =
{−⌊N2 ⌋, · · · , 0, · · · , ⌊
N
2 ⌋), and Z2 = {0, 1}. As we use
PCDD for offline processing and its plaintext domain
is ZN , we define the operation ⌈x⌋N which transforms
data x from group ZN into the group DN , i.e.,
⌈x⌋N ←
{
x, 0 ≤ x < N/2
x−N, N/2 ≤ x < N.
Moreover, the data ⌈x⌋N in group DN can be directly
transformed into group ZN with x = ⌈x⌋N mod N .
It can be easily verified that group DN and ZN are
isomorphism.
To guarantee the security of secret sharing, two types
of data shares are used in the LightCom, called integer
share (belonged to ZN ) and binary share (belonged to
Z2). For the integer share separation, RU only needs
to execute Share(m), such that m = m1 + · · · + mP ,
where m,m1, · · · ,mP ∈ DN . For the binary shares, RU
executes Share(m), such that m = m1 + · · · + mP ,
where m,m1, · · · ,mP ∈ Z2. After that, RU securely sends
integer share mi or binary shares mi to TPU i, and seals
to UnS for securely storage.
5.2 System Initial and Key Distribution
The LightCom system should be initialized before
achieving the secure computation. Firstly, the RU exe-
cutes KeyGen algorithm, output public key pk = (N, g)
and private key is sk = θ. Then, use KeyS to split key θ
into P shares ski = θi (i = 1, · · · ,P). After that, for each
TPU i in the cloud, it initials an enclave i, builds a secure
channel, and uploads the ski to the enclave i securely.
Beside, the RU’s PCDD public key pk and program Ci
for the specific function F are needed to securely send
to TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P). Finally, the TPU i securely seals
the data pk, ski, Ci into UnS. As all the parameters need
to load to the TPU enclaves along with the data shares
according the specific functionality, we will not specially
describe it in the rest of the section.
5.3 Secure Distributed Decryption Algorithm (SDD)
Before constructing the TPU-based operation, we need
first to construct the algorithm called Secure Distributed
Decryption (SDD) which allows all the TPUs decrypt
PCDD’s ciphertext. Mathematically, if enclave in TPU χ
contains the encryption [[x]], the goal of SDD is to output
x which contains following steps: 1) The TPU enclave χ
establishes a secure channel with the other TPU enclave
i(i 6= χ). Then, enclave χ sends [[x]] to all the other
enclave i. 2) Once received [[x]], the TPU i uses PDec
algorithm to get CTi and securely send CTi to enclave
χ. 3) Finally, the TPU χ securely uses CTχ with TDec
algorithm to get x.
5.4 Secure TPU-based Data Seal & UnSeal
As TPU enclaves are only provide an isolated computing
environment during the secure processing, the data in
the TPU enclave needs to seal to UnS for long-term
storage. Thus, we propose two algorithms called Seal
and UnSeal to achieve.
Seal(xi) : The TPU i encrypts the data share x into
[[xi]], then uses hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → ZN with
input the [[xi]] associated with TPU t-time period private
key share sk
(t)
i to compute St,i ← H([[xi]]||sk
(t)
i ||IDi||t),
where IDi is the transaction identity for [[xi]]. Then, TPU
i sends [[xi]] with St,i to UnS for storage.
7UnSeal([[x]], St,i) : The TPU i loads [[xi]] with St,i to
the enclave i, and computes H([[x]]||sk
(t)
i ||IDi||t) to test
whether the result is equal to St,i. If the equation does
not holds, the algorithm stops and outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
the TPU i uses SDD to get the share xi.
5.5 Random Shares Generation
The secret sharing based privacy computation requires
one-time random numbers for processing. Before con-
structing the TPU-based computation, we design a pro-
tocol called Random Tuple Generation Protocol (RTG).
The goal of RTG is to let TPUs cooperatively generate
random tuple r
(1)
i , · · · , r
(ℓ)
i ∈ Z2 and ri ∈ DN for
each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P), such that r = −r(ℓ)2ℓ−1 +∑ℓ−1
j=1 r
(j)2j−1 and r(j) = r
(j)
1 ⊕· · ·⊕ r
(j)
P and r = r1+ · · ·+
rP holds, where ℓ is the bit-length of random number
r ∈ DN . The RTG generates as follows:
1) The TPU 1 randomly generates r
(1)
1 , · · · , r
(ℓ)
1 ∈
Z2, encrypts them as [[r
(1)
1 ]], · · · , [[r
(ℓ)
1 ]], denotes them as
[[r(1)]], · · · , [[r(ℓ)]], and sends these ciphertexts to TPU 2.
2) The TPU i (i = 2, · · · ,P) generates r
(1)
i , · · · , r
(ℓ)
i ∈ Z2
and computes
[[r(j)]]← [[r(j)]](1−r
(j)
i
) · ([[1]] · [[r(j)]]N−1)r
(j)
i = [[r(j) ⊕ r
(j)
i ]].
If i 6= P , the TPU i sends [[r(1)]], · · · , [[r(ℓ)]] to TPU i + 1.
If i = P , the TPU P computes
[[r]] ← [[r(ℓ)]]N−2
ℓ−1
· [[r(ℓ−1)]]2
ℓ−2
· · · · · [[r(1)]].
3) For TPU i (i = P , · · · , 2), randomly generates ri ∈ DN
and computes [[r]] ← [[r]]·[[−ri]], and sends [[r]] to TPU i−1.
Once TPU 1 gets [[r]], uses SDD to get r, and denotes ⌈r⌋N
as r1. After computation, each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) holds
randomly bits r
(1)
i , · · · , r
(ℓ)
i ∈ Z2 and integer ri ∈ DN .
5.6 Share Domain Transformation
5.6.1 Binary Share to Integer Share Transformation
(B2I)
Suppose TPU i hold a bit share ai ∈ Z2, where a1⊕· · ·⊕
aP = s ∈ Z2, the goal of the protocol is to generate a
random integer share bi ∈ ZN for each TPU i, such that
b1 + · · · + bP = s. To execute B2I, the TPU 1 randomly
generates b1 ∈ ZN , denotes x = b1 and s = a1, encrypts
x as [[x]], s as [[s]], and sends [[x]] and [[s]] to TPU 2. After
that, the TPU i (i = 2, · · · ,P − 1) generates bi ∈ ZN and
computes
[[s]]← [[s]](1−ai) · ([[1]] · [[s]]N−1)ai = [[s⊕ ai]], [[x]] ← [[x]] · [[bi]],
and sends [[x]], [[s]] to TPU i+1. Once received the [[x]], [[s]],
TPU P computes
[[s]]← [[s]](1−aP) · ([[1]] · [[s]]N−1)aP = [[s⊕ aP ]],
[[bP ]] ← [[s]] · [[x]]
N−1,
and uses the SDD to decrypt and gets bP .
5.6.2 Integer Share to Binary Share Transformation
(I2B)
Suppose TPU i hold an integer share ai ∈ ZN , where
a1 + · · ·+ aP = s ∈ Z2, the goal of the I2B protocol is to
generate a random bit share bi ∈ Z2 for each TPU i, such
that b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bP = s. To execute I2B, the TPU 1 lets
y = a1, encrypts y as [[y]], and sends the ciphertext to TPU
2 for computation. After that, the TPU i (i = 2, · · · ,P)
uses the share to compute [[y]]← [[y]] · [[ai]]. If i 6= P , TPU
i sends [[y]] to TPU i + 1. After that, denote [[s]] ← [[y]],
and each TPU i (i = P , · · · , 2) generates bi ∈ Z2 and
computes
[[s]] ← [[s]](1−bi) · ([[1]] · [[s]]N−1)bi = [[s⊕ bi]],
and sends [[s]] to TPU i − 1. Once received [[s]], TPU 1
uses the SDD to decrypt [[s]] and denotes the result s as
b1.
6 TPU-BASED SECURE OUTSOURCED COM-
PUTING TOOLKITS IN THE CLOUD
In this section, we introduce and construct the commonly
used secure outsourced binary and integer computation
sub-protocols for a single cloud.
6.1 Secure Computation over Binary Shares
6.1.1 Secure Bit Multiplication Protocol (SBM)
The SBM can achieve plaintext multiplication on bit
shares and output are bit shares, i.e., given two shares
xi, yi ∈ Z2 (i = 1, · · · ,P) for TPU i as input, SBM
securely outputs fi ∈ Z2 for TPU i, such that
⊕P
i=1 fi =
(
⊕P
i=1 xi) ∧ (
⊕P
i=1 yi).
Offline Stage: All the TPUs initialize their enclaves
and load the public parameters to UnS. For enclave
1, generate a1, b1 ∈ Z2, compute c = a1 · b1 ∈ Z2.
Encrypt [[a1]], [[b1]] and [[c]], and denote them as [[a]], [[b]], [[c]],
respectively. After that, TPU enclave i (i = 1, · · · ,P − 1)
sends [[a]], [[b]], [[c]] to enclave i + 1, TPU i + 1 generates
ai+1, bi+1 and compute
[[A]] ← [[a]] · [[c]]N−1 = [[a · (1− b)]],
[[B]] ← [[b]] · [[c]]N−1 = [[b · (1− a)]],
[[C]]← [[1]] · [[a]]N−1 · [[b]]N−1 · [[c]] = [[(1 − b) · (1− a)]],
[[c]] ← [[c]](1−ai+1)(1−bi+1) · [[C]]ai+1·bi+1 · [[A]](1−ai+1)bi+1
· [[B]]ai+1(1−bi+1) = [[(a⊕ ai+1) ∧ (b⊕ bi+1)]].
[[a]]← [[a]](1−ai+1) · ([[1]] · [[a]]N−1)ai+1 = [[a⊕ ai+1]],
[[b]] ← [[b]](1−bi+1) · ([[1]] · [[b]]N−1)bi+1 = [[b ⊕ bi+1]].
After the above computation, enclave i (i = P , · · · , 2)
randomly generates ci ∈ ZN and computes [[c]] ←
[[c]](1−ci) ·([[1]] · [[c]]N−1)ci = [[c⊕ci]]. When the TPU 2 sends
[[c]] to TPU 1, the TPU 1 uses SDD to get c and denotes
as c1. After the above computation, each enclave holds
ai, bi, ci, which satisfies a1⊕· · ·⊕aP = a, b1⊕· · ·⊕bP = b,
8c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cP = c and c = a ∧ b. Finally, each TPU i seals
ai, bi, ci to UnS for storage individually.
Online Stage: For each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P), load the
ai, bi, ci into the enclave i. Then, compute Xi = xi ⊕ ai
and Yi = yi⊕bi. Securely send Xi and Yi to other enclave
j (j = 1, · · · ,P ; j 6= i). After receiving other Xj and Yj ,
each TPUs computes X =
⊕P
i=1Xj and Y =
⊕P
i=1 Yj .
For TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P − 1), compute fi ← ci ⊕ (bi ∧
X)⊕ (ai ∧ Y ). Then, TPU P computes fP ← cP ⊕ (bP ∧
X)⊕ (aP ∧ Y ) ⊕ (X ∧ Y ). Here, we denote the protocol
as 〈f〉 ← SBM(〈x〉, 〈y〉).
6.1.2 Secure Bit-wise Addition Protocol (BAdd)
The BAdd describes as follows: the TPU i holds bit shares
a
(ℓ)
i , · · · , a
(1)
i of ℓ bit-length integer a and r
(ℓ)
i , · · · , r
(1)
i of ℓ
bit-length integer r. The goal is to compute y
(ℓ)
i , · · · , y
(1)
i ,
such that y = a+r, where y = −y(ℓ)2ℓ−1+
∑ℓ−1
j=1 y
(j)2j−1,
a(j) = a
(j)
1 ⊕a
(j)
2 ⊕· · ·⊕a
(j)
P , y
(j) = y
(j)
1 ⊕y
(j)
2 ⊕· · ·⊕y
(j)
P and
r(j) = r
(j)
1 ⊕r
(j)
2 ⊕· · ·⊕r
(j)
P . The idea is easy and simple: use
the binary addition circuit to achieve the addition, i.e,
compute the integer addition as y(j) = a(j)⊕r(j)⊕c(j) and
c(j+1) = (a(j) ∧ r(j))⊕ ((a(j) ⊕ r(j))∧ c(j)) for j = 1, · · · , ℓ.
The procedure of BAdd works as follows:
1) For each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) and each bit position
j = 1, · · · , ℓ, all the TPUs jointly compute d
(j)
i ← a
(j)
i ⊕r
(j)
i
and 〈e(j)〉 ← SBM(〈a(j)〉, 〈r(j)〉). After using the computa-
tion of SBM, it indeed computes e(j) = a(j) ∧ r(j).
2) Each TPU i sets c
(1)
i ← 0 and y
(1)
i ← d
(1)
i . Then, for
j = 2, · · · , ℓ, all TPUs jointly computes
〈d(j−1)〉 ← SBM(〈d(j−1)〉, 〈c(j−1)〉).
Moreover, for each TPU i locally computes
c
(j)
i ← d
(j−1)
i ⊕ e
(j−1)
i and y
(j)
i ← d
(j)
i ⊕ c
(j)
i .
and outputs y
(j)
i for all j.
6.1.3 Secure Bit Extraction Protocol (BExt)
Suppose TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) contains an integer share
ui, where u =
∑P
i=1 ui. The goal of BExt is to output
the bit extraction shares u
(ℓ)
i , · · · , u
(1)
i for each TPU i
(i = 1, · · · ,P), where u = −u(ℓ)2ℓ−1 +
∑ℓ−1
j=1 u
(j)2j−1 and
u(j) =
⊕P
i=1 u
(j)
i . The BExt also contains offline/online
phase which describes as follows:
Offline Phase: Execute RTG to get r
(ℓ)
i , · · · , r
(1)
i and ri
for party i. Then, all the TPUs need to jointly compute
a(ℓ), · · · , a(1) ∈ Z2, such that a(ℓ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ a(1) = 0. Firstly,
TPU 1 randomly generates a
(ℓ)
1 , · · · , a
(1)
1 ∈ Z2 and let
t(j) = a
(j)
1 for j = 1, · · · ,P . After that, the TPU i
generates a
(ℓ)
i , · · · , a
(1)
i ∈ Z2, computes
[[t(j)]]← [[t(j)]](1−a
(j)
i
) · ([[1]] · [[t(j)]]N−1)a
(j)
i = [[t(j) ⊕ a
(j)
i ]],
and sends these ciphertexts to TPU i + 1. Once the
[[t(ℓ−1)]], · · · , [[t(0)]] are received, the TPU P uses the
SDD to decrypt, gets t(ℓ), · · · , t(1) and denotes them as
a
(ℓ)
P , · · · , a
(1)
P . After that, each TPU i seals r
(ℓ)
i , · · · , r
(1)
i
and ri and a
(ℓ)
i , · · · , a
(1)
i in UnS, respectively.
Online Phase: The TPU i computes vi = ui − ri, en-
crypts vi and sends [[vi]] to TPU P . After received all the
encryptions, the TPU P computes [[v]] ←
∏n
i=1[[vi]] and
executes SDD to get the v, and computes ⌈v⌋N . Then, TPU
P generates its twos complement binary representation
v(ℓ−1), · · · , v(0), and computes v
(j)
P ← v
(j) ⊕ a
(j)
P , where
j = 1, · · · , ℓ. Other TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P − 1) keeps other
v
(ℓ)
i ← a
(ℓ)
i , · · · , v
(1)
i ← a
(1)
i unchanged.
After that, all the TPUs jointly compute
(~u1, · · · ,~uP)← BAdd(~v1, · · · ,~vP ;~r1, · · · ,~rP ),
where ~ui = (u
(ℓ)
i , · · · , u
(1)
i ), ~vi = (v
(ℓ)
i , · · · , v
(1)
i ), ~ri =
(r
(ℓ)
i , · · · , r
(1)
i ). Finally, the BExt algorithm outputs ~ui =
(u
(ℓ)
i , · · · , u
(1)
i ) for TPU i = 1, · · · ,P .
6.2 Secure Integer Computation
6.2.1 Secure Multiplication Protocol (SM)
The SM achieves integer multiplication over integer
shares, i.e., given shares xi, yi (i = 1, · · · ,P) for TPU
i as input, SM securely outputs fi for TPU i, such
that
∑P
i=1 fi = x · y, where data shares xi, yi satisfy
x =
∑P
i=1 yi and y =
∑P
i=1 yi.
Offline Stage: All the TPUs initialize their enclaves
and load the public parameters to the UnS. Then, for
the enclave 1, it generates a1, b1 ∈ DN , computes z =
a1 ·b1, encrypts [[a1]], [[b1]], [[z]], and lets them be [[a]], [[b]], [[c]],
respectively. After that, enclave i (i = 1, · · · ,P−1) sends
[[a]], [[b]], [[c]] to enclave i+1, TPU i+1 generates ai+1, bi+1
and computes
[[c]] ← [[c]] · [[ai+1 · bi+1]] · [[a]]bi+1 · [[b]]ai+1 ,
[[a]]← [[a]] · [[ai+1]], [[b]]← [[b]] · [[bi+1]].
After the computation, for i = P , · · · , 2, TPU enclave i
generates ci ∈ DN and computes [[c]] = [[c]] · [[ci]]N−1. After
the computation, the TPU 2 sends [[c]] to TPU 1. Then,
TPU 1 uses SDD to get c and denotes the final result
⌊c⌉N as c1. After the above computation, each enclave
hold ai, bi, ci, such that ⌈a1 + · · · + aP⌋N = ⌈a⌋N , ⌊b1 +
· · ·+ bP⌉N = ⌈b⌋N , ⌈c1 + · · ·+ cP⌋N = ⌈c⌋N and c = a · b
mod N . After the computation, each TPU enclave i seals
ai, bi, ci to UnS for storage individually.
Online Stage: TPU i loads the ai, bi, ci into the enclave
i. Then, compute Xi = xi − ai and Yi = yi − bi. Securely
send Xi and Yi to other enclave j (j = 1, · · · ,P ; j 6= i).
After receiving other Xj and Yj , the each TPU i com-
putes X =
∑P
i=1Xj and Y =
∑P
i=1 Yj . After that, for
each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P − 1), compute fi ← ⌈ci+ biX +
aiY ⌋N . For TPU P , compute fP ← ⌈cP+bPX+aPY +X ·
Y ⌋N . Here, we denote the protocol as 〈f〉 ← SM(〈x〉, 〈y〉).
6.2.2 Secure Monic Monomials Computation (SMM)
The SMM protocol can achieve monic monomials com-
putation over integer shares, i.e., given a share xi (i =
1, · · · ,P) and a public integer number k for TPU i as
input, SMM securely outputs fi for TPU i, such that∑P
i=1 fi = x
k, where data shares xi satisfy x =
∑P
i=1 xi.
9The construction of the SMM is list as follows: Denote
k as binary form kℓ, · · · , k1. Initialize the share fi ← xi
for each TPU i. For j = ℓ − 1, · · · , 1, compute 〈f∗〉 ←
SM(〈f〉, 〈f〉). If kj = 1, compute 〈f〉 ← SM(〈f∗〉, 〈x〉).
Otherwise, let 〈f〉 ← 〈f∗〉. Here, the algorithm outputs
〈f〉 and denotes the protocol as 〈f〉 ← SMM(〈x〉, k).
6.2.3 Secure Binary Exponential Protocol (SEP2)
The SEP2 can achieve exponential over binary shares
with a public base, i.e., given a binary share xi ∈ Z2
(i = 1, · · · ,P) and a public integer β for TPU i as input13,
SEP2 securely outputs an integer share fi ∈ ZN for TPU
i, such that
∑P
i=1 fi = β
x, where x =
⊕P
i=1 xi.
Offline Stage: All the TPUs initialize their enclaves
and load the public parameters to the UnS. Then, for
the enclave 1, it generates a1 ∈ Z2, encrypts a1 as [[a1]],
and lets it be [[a]]. After that, enclave i (i = 1, · · · ,P − 1)
sends [[a]] to enclave i+1, TPU i+1 generates ai+1 ∈ Z2,
computes
[[a]]← [[a]](1−ai+1) · ([[1]] · [[a]]N−1)ai+1 = [[a⊕ ai+1]],
Once [[a]] is received, TPU computes
[[b]] = [[a]]β · ([[1]] · [[a]]N−1) = [[β · a+ (1 − a)]] = [[βa]]
[[b∗]] = [[a]] · ([[1]] · [[a]]N−1)β = [[a + β(1− a)]] = [[β1−a]]
After the computation, for i = P , · · · , 2, TPU i gen-
erates bi, b
∗
i ∈ DN and computes [[b]] = [[b]] · [[bi]]
N−1 and
[[b∗]] = [[b∗]] · [[b∗i ]]
N−1. After the computation, the TPU 2
sends [[b]] and [[b∗]] to TPU 1, and TPU 1 uses SDD to
get b, b∗ and denote them as b1 and b
∗
1, respectively.
After the above computation, each TPU i holds ai, bi,
which satisfies a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ aP = a, b1 + · · · + bP = βa,
b∗1 + · · ·+ b
∗
P = β
1−a. After the computation, each TPU i
seals ai, bi to UnS for storage individually.
Online Stage: TPU i loads the data share xi and
random shares ai, bi into the its enclave. Then, TPU
i locally computes Xi = xi ⊕ ai. Securely send Xi to
other enclave j (j = 1, · · · ,P ; j 6= i). After receiving
other Xj , each TPU i locally computes X =
⊕P
i=1Xi
and fi ← ⌈(b∗i )
X · (bi)1−X⌋N . We can easily verify that∑P
i=1 fi = β
(1−a)(x⊕a)+a(1−x⊕a) = βx. Here, we denote
the protocol as 〈f〉 ← SEP2(〈x〉, β).
6.2.4 Secure Integer Exponential Protocol (SEP)
The SEP can achieve exponential over integer shares
with a public base, i.e., given an integer share xi ∈ DN
(i = 1, · · · ,P) and a public integer β for TPU i as input ,
SEP securely outputs shares fi ∈ DN for TPU i, such that∑P
i=1 fi = β
x, where data shares xi satisfy x =
∑P
i=1 xi
and x is relative small positive number with ℓ bit-length.
i) Compute (~x1, · · · ,~xP) ← BExt(x1, · · · , xP), where
~xi = (x
(ℓ)
i , · · · , x
(1)
i ) for TPU i = 1, · · · ,P , and x
(j) =⊕P
i=1 x
(j)
i , and x =
∑ℓ
j=1 x
(j)2j−1.
ii) Execute 〈f〉 ← SEP2(〈x(1)〉, β). For j = 2, · · · , ℓ,
compute 〈fj〉 ← SEP2(〈x(j)〉, β), 〈f∗j 〉 ← SMM(〈fj〉, 2
j−1),
13. β is a small positive number which satisfies gcd(β,N) = 1.
and 〈f〉 ← SM(〈f〉, 〈f∗j 〉). The SEP outputs 〈f〉, and we
denote the protocol as 〈f〉 ← SEP(〈x〉, β).
6.2.5 Secure Comparison Protocol (SC)
The SC can securely compute the relationship between
integer u and v, where each TPU i holds shares ui and
vi, where u = u1 + · · · + uP , v = v1 + · · · + vP . The
construction of SC is listed as follows:
i) Each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) locally computes wi =
ui − vi. After that, all TPUs jointly compute
(~w1, · · · , ~wP )← BExt(w1, · · · , wP).
ii) As we use twos complement binary representation,
the most significant digit of u−v will reflect the relation-
ship between the u and v. After the above computation,
TPU i outputs w
(ℓ−1)
i ∈ ~wi. The most significant digit
w(ℓ−1) of w =
∑P
i=1 wi decides the relationship of u
and v, specifically, if
⊕P
i=1 w
(ℓ−1)
i = 0, it denotes u ≥ v.
Otherwise, it denotes u < v.
6.2.6 Secure Equivalent Protocol (SEQ)
The goal of secure equivalent protocol SEQ is to test
whether the two values u, v are equal or not by giving
the shares of the two values 〈u〉, 〈v〉. Mathematically,
given two shares 〈u〉 and 〈v〉, SEQ [7] outputs the shares
fi for each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) to determine whether the
plaintext of the two data are equivalent (i.e. test u
?
= v.
If
⊕P
i=1 fi = 1, then u = v; otherwise, u 6= v). The SEQ is
described as follows:
i) All the TPUs jointly calculate
〈t∗1〉 ← SC(〈u〉, 〈v〉); 〈t
∗
2〉 ← SC(〈v〉, 〈u〉).
ii) For each TPU i, it computes fi = t
∗
1,i ⊕ t
∗
2,i locally,
and outputs fi ∈ Z2.
6.2.7 Secure Minimum of Two Number Protocol (Min2)
The TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P) stores shares 〈x〉 and 〈y〉 of two
numbers x and y, The Min2 protocol outputs share 〈B〉
of minimum number B, s.t., B = min(x, y). The Min2 is
described as follows:
i) All the TPUs can jointly compute
〈u〉 ← SC(〈x〉, 〈y〉); 〈u〉 ← B2I(〈u〉); 〈X〉 ← SM(〈x〉, 〈u〉).
〈Y 〉 ← SM(〈y〉, 〈u〉).
ii) The TPU i computes locally and outputs Bi = yi −
Yi +Xi.
6.2.8 Secure Minimum of H Numbers Protocol (MinH )
The goal of MinH is to get the minimum number
among H numbers. Given the shares x1,i, · · · , xH,i for
TPU i, the goal is to compute the share x∗i for TPU i
such that x∗ stores the minimum integer value among
x1, · · · , xH , where x∗ =
∑P
i=1 x
∗
i , xj =
∑P
i=1 xi,j for
j = 1, · · · , H . The MinH executes as follows: Each TPU
i puts x1,i, · · · , xH,i into a set Si. If L(Si) = 1, the
share remaining in L(Si) is the final output. Otherwise,
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the protocol is processed according to the following
conditions.
• If L(Si) mod 2 = 0 and L(Si) > 1, 1) set S′i ← ∅; 2)
for j = 1, · · · ,L(Si)/2, compute
〈xj〉 ← Min2(〈x2j−1〉, 〈x2j〉), (1)
and add xj,i to the set S
′
i; 3) clear set Si and let Si ← S
′
i.
• If L(Si) mod 2 6= 0 and L(Si) > 1, take out the last
tuple xL(Si)−1,i from set Si s.t., L(Si) mod 2 = 0. Run
the above procedure (L(Si) mod 2 = 0 and L(Si) > 1)
to generate set S′i. Put xL(Si)−1,i into a set S
′
i and denote
S′i ← Si.
After computation, each set Si in TPU i only contains
one element and we denote it as x∗i . Thus, we denote
the algorithm as 〈x∗〉 ← MaxH(〈x1〉, · · · , 〈xH〉).
6.3 Security Extension of Integer Computation
The above the secure computation only consider the data
privacy. Two types of information can be leaked to the
adversary: 1) the access pattern of function’s input, and
2) the access pattern of RU’s result retrieve. Here, we
give two security extension to achieve access pattern
hiding and private information retrieve, respectively.
6.3.1 Achieve Input Access pattern Hiding (APH)
As data are directly sealed in the UnS, the adversary
may analysis the access pattern of UnS without knowing
the function’s input. Suppose the system contains H
data x∗1, · · · , x
∗
H ∈ DN . The data share xj,i are hold
by each TPU i (j = 1, · · · , H ; i = 1, · · · ,P), such that
xj,1 + · · · + xj,P = x∗j . To achieve access pattern hiding,
the homomorphic property of PCDD can be used. Specif-
ically, the RU uploads [[a1]], · · · , [[aH ]] to each TPU i, s.t.,
for a specific 1 ≤ γ ≤ H , it has aγ = 1, and other j 6= γ
and 1 ≤ j ≤ H , it holds aj = 0. Then, the goal of the
algorithm is to securely select the shares of xγ,j from the
input shares, and constructs as follows:
1) Obviously select encrypted shares. Each TPU initializes
an enclave. Then, for each TPU i (i = 1, · · · ,P), compute
[[bi]] ← [[a1]]
x1,i · [[a2]]
x2,i · · · · · [[aH ]]
xH,i mod N2.
2) Securely update share [[bi]] for TPU i. Without any
share update, the adversary can still know the access
pattern once the ciphertexts are decrypted. Thus, all
the shares should be dynamically updated before the
decryption.
The TPU i picks random numbers δi,1, · · · , δi,P ∈ ZN
such that δi,1 + · · ·+ δi,P = 0 mod N , and then encrypts
δi,j and sends [[δi,j ]] to TPU enclave j. Once all the update
shares are received, TPU i computes
[[b∗i ]]← [[bi]] · [[δ1,i]] · [[δ2,i]] · · · · · [[δP,i]] mod N
2.
Finally, each TPU i uses the SDD to get b∗i and denotes
⌈b∗i ⌋N as the final share output.
6.3.2 Achieve Private Information Retrieve (PIR)
If the computation results is needed, the RU will let the
TPU to send the data shares back via a secure channel.
However, if one of the TPU has been compromised, even
if the data cannot been known by the adversary, the
retrieve access pattern has been leaked to the adversary.
Suppose the system contains H data x∗1, · · · , x
∗
H ∈ DN .
The data share xj,i are hold by each TPU i (j =
1, · · · , H ; i = 1, · · · ,P), such that xj,1 + · · · + xj,P = x∗j .
Thus, to achieve the private information retrieve, the RU
uploads [[a1]], · · · , [[aH ]] to each TPU, s.t., for a specific
1 ≤ γ ≤ H , it has aγ = 1, and other j 6= γ, 1 ≤ j ≤ H , it
holds aj = 0. The goal of PIR is to let RU privately
retrieve xγ . Then, the algorithm computes among all
TPUs as follows:
1) For each TPU i, compute
[[bi]]← [[a1]]
x1,i · [[a2]]
x2,i · · · · · [[aH ]]
xH,i mod N2.
2) TPU 1 denotes [[b∗]] ← [[b1]], and sends [[b∗]] to TPU 2.
Then, each TPU i = 2, · · · ,P , computes [[b∗]]← [[b∗]] · [[bi]]
mod N2. If i = P , then send [[b∗]] to RU. Otherwise, [[b∗]]
is sent from TPU i to i + 1. Finally, RU uses the Dec to
get the b∗, such that xγ = ⌈b∗i ⌋N is the output share.
6.4 Secure Floating Point Number Computation
6.4.1 Data Format of Floating-Point Number
To achieve the real number storage and computation, we
can refer to the IEEE 754 standard to use Floating-Point
Number (FPN) for real number storage. To support the
LightCom, we change the traditional FPN and describe
the FPN by four integers: 1) a radix (or base) β ≥ 2; 2)
a precision η ≥ 2 (roughly speaking, η is the number
of “significant digits” of the representation); 3) two
extremal exponents emin and emax such that emin <
0 < emax. A finite FPN aˆ in such a format is a number
for which there exists at least one representation triplet
(m, e) with public parameters β, η, emin, emax, such that,
aˆ = m · βe−η+1.
• m is an integer which −βη + 1 ≤ m ≤ βη − 1. It is
called the integral significand of the representation
of x;
• e is an integer such that emin ≤ e ≤ emax, called the
exponent of the representation of a.
As only the significand and exponent contains sensitive
information, we assume all the FPNs have the same
public base β = 10, and use the fix bit-length to store
the integer m. Thus, to achieve the secure storage,
the RU only needs to random share the aˆ into aˆ1 =
(m1, e1), · · · , aˆP = (mP , eP), and sends aˆi to TPU i for
storage, respectively.
For the secure FPN computation, if all the FPNs are
transformed with the same exponential, we can directly
use secure integer computation method introduced in
Section 6. Thus, the key problem to achieve the secure
FPN computation is how to allow all the FPNs securely
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transformed with the same exponential. Here, we first
construct an algorithm called Secure Uniform Compu-
tation (UNI) and then achieve the commonly-used FPN
computations.
6.4.2 Secure Uniform Computation (UNI)
Assume each TPU i(i = 1, · · · ,P) stores into aˆj,i =
(mj,i, ej,i) , the goal of UNI is to output aˆ
∗
j,1 = (m
∗
j,1, e
∗
j,1)
for j = 1, · · · , H , and the construction of UNI can be
described as follows:
i) All the TPUs jointly compute
〈e∗〉 ← MinH(〈e1〉, · · · , 〈eH〉). (2)
ii) Each TPUs locally computes 〈cj〉 = 〈ej〉 − 〈e∗i 〉.
As ej − e∗ is a relative small number, TPUs jointly
executes 〈10ej−e
∗
〉 ← SEP(〈cj〉, 10) and 〈m
∗
j 〉 ←
SM(〈10ej−e
∗
〉, 〈mj〉).
After computation, all the 〈a1〉, · · · , 〈aH〉 will trans-
form to 〈a∗1〉, · · · , 〈a
∗
H〉 which shares the same e
∗, where
〈aˆj〉 = (〈m∗j 〉, 〈e
∗〉).
6.4.3 Computation Transformation
The secure floating-point number computation can be
transformed into the secure integer computation proto-
cols with the usage of UNI. Formally, given FPN shares
〈aˆj〉 = (〈mj〉, 〈ej〉), (for j = 1, · · · , H), we can first
compute
(〈aˆ∗1〉, · · · , 〈aˆ
∗
H〉) ← UNI(〈aˆ1〉, · · · , 〈aˆH〉),
where 〈aˆ∗j 〉 = (〈m
∗
j 〉, 〈eˆ
∗〉). Then,
(〈y∗1〉, · · · , 〈y
∗
ζ 〉) ← SIF(〈m
∗
1〉, · · · , 〈m
∗
ξ〉),
where SIF denote secure integer computation protocol
designed in Section 6, and 〈y∗1〉, · · · , 〈y
∗
ζ 〉 can be either
integer shares or binary shares according to the function
type. If the SIF is the SC and SEQ, then the SIF output
the binary share 〈y∗〉 as the final output, and we denote
these two algorithms as secure FPN comparison (FC) and
secure FPN equivalent test protocol (FEQ). If the SIF is
the SM, SMM, Min2 and MinH , then the SIF outputs the
integer share 〈y∗1〉, and denotes 〈yˆ
∗〉 = (〈y∗1〉, 〈e
∗〉) as the
secure FPN’s output, and we denote above four algo-
rithms as secure FPN multiplication (FM), secure FPN
monic monomials computation (FMM), secure minimum
of two FPNs protocol (FMin2), and secure minimum of
H FPNs protocol (FMinH ), respectively. Specifically, for
the multiple FPN addition (FAdd), given FPN shares
〈aˆj〉 = (〈mj〉, 〈ej〉), (for j = 1, · · · , H), we can first
compute 〈aˆ∗1〉, · · · , 〈aˆ
∗
H〉 with the UNI, where 〈aˆ
∗
j 〉 =
(〈m∗j 〉, 〈e
∗〉). Then, compute 〈y∗〉 ←
∑H
j=1〈m
∗
j 〉 and de-
note the final FPN addition result as 〈yˆ〉 = (〈y∗〉, 〈e∗〉).
6.4.4 Secure Extension for FPN Computation
Similar to the secure integer computation, we have the
three following extension for LightCom.
Access Pattern Hiding: As all the secure FPN compu-
tation can be transformed in to secure integer computa-
tion with the help of the UNI, we can also use the same
method in section 6.3.1 to achieve input access pattern
hiding for the secure FPN computation.
Achieve Private FPN Retrieve: In out LightCom, one
floating point number can be securely stored as two
integer numbers. Thus, we can use the method in section
6.3.2 to privately retrieve integer for twice to achieve the
private FPN retrieve.
6.5 Functional Extension for LightCom
6.5.1 Non-numerical Data Storage and Processing
For the non-numerical data storage, the traditional char-
acter encodings with Unicode [8] and its standard Uni-
code Transformation Format (UTF) schemes can be used
which maps a character into an integer. Specifically, for
secure storage, use UTF-8 to map the character into 32-bit
number x, randomly splits x into x1, · · · , xP , such that
x1 + · · ·+ xP = x, and sends ai to TPU i for processing.
In this case, all the non-numerical data processing can
be transformed into secure integer computation which
can be found in section 6. For the secure storage, each
TPU i securely seals the share ai into the UnS with
the algorithm Seal in Section 5.4. Once the data shares
are needed for processing, TPUs needs to use UnSeal
algorithm to recover the message from UnS.
6.5.2 Extension of Multiple User Computation
All the secure computations in the previous section are
designed for the single user setting, i.e., all the data
are encrypted under a same RU’s public key. If all RUs
want to jointly achieve a secure computation, each RU
j(j = 1, · · · , ψ) executes KeyGen to generate public key
pkj and private key is skj locally. Then, RU j uses KeyS
to split key skj into P shares 〈skj〉, and sends these
shares to TPUs in the cloud. Assume RU j’s ciphertext
[[xj ]]pkj is securely stored in UnS, TPUs can get data
shares 〈xj〉 with UnSeal and achieve the corresponding
secure computations GenCpt in Section 4.3 with these
shares.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze the security of the basic
crypto primitives and the sub-protocols, before demon-
strating the security of our LightCom framework.
7.1 Analysis of Basic Crypto Primitives
7.1.1 The Security of Secret Sharing Scheme
Here, we give the following theorem to show the security
of the additive secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 1. A additive secret sharing scheme achieves an
information theoretic secure when the P participants can
reconstruct the secret x ∈ G, while any smaller set cannot
discover anything information about the secret.
Proof. The shares X1, · · · , XP are selected with random
uniform distribution among P participants such that
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X1+ · · ·+XP = m ∈ G. Even the attacker A holds P − 1
shares, (s)he can only compute x′ =
∑P−1
i=1 X
′
i, where
X ′i is selected from X1, · · · , XP . The element x is still
protected due to the x = x′ + X ′P . Since random value
X ′P is unknown for A, it leaks no information about the
value x.
Theorem 2. A proactive additive secret sharing scheme
achieves an information theoretic secure if satisfies the fol-
lowing properties: I. Robustness: The new updated shares
are corresponding to the secret x (i.e., all the new shares can
reconstructed the secret x). II. Secrecy: The adversary at any
time period knows no more than P shares (possible a different
shares in each time period) learns nothing about the secret.
Proof. The data shares X
(t)
i in time period t are stored
in party i, s.t.,
∑P
i=1X
(t)
1 = x. Each party i generates
shares δ
(t)
i,1 , · · · , δ
(t)
i,P which satisfies δ
(t)
i,1 + · · · + δ
(t)
i,P = 0
mod N . Thus, the new shares denote X
(t+1)
i = X
(t)
i +
δ
(t)
1,i+ · · ·+ δ
(t)
P,i, and satisfy
∑P
i=1X
(t+1)
i =
∑P
i=1X
(t+1)
i +∑P
i=1
∑P
i=1 δ
(t)
i,j = x which the robustness property hold.
To guarantee the secrecy property, the data shares
in time period t can achieve the information theoretic
secure according to the theorem 1. Even adversary can
get P − 1 shares in each time period t (t ≤ t∗), the
adversary can compute x(t) = x−X
(t)
Pt
=
∑P
i=1,i6=Pt
X
(t)
i ,
where X
(t)
Pt
is the non-compromised share in time period
t. The adversaryA∗ still cannot get any information from
x(1), · · · , x(t∗) as δ
(1)
P1,P1
, · · · , δ
(t∗)
Pt∗ ,Pt∗
are independently
and randomly generated and cannot be compromised
by the adversary. Thus, the secrecy property holds.
7.1.2 The Security of PCDD
The security of our PCDD is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. The PCDD scheme described in Section 2.3 is
semantically secure, based on the assumed intractability of the
DDH assumption over Z∗
N2
.
Proof. The security of PCDD has been proven to be
semantically secure under the DDH assumption over
Z∗N2 in the standard model [9].
7.2 Security of TPU-based Basic Operation
Theorem 4. The RTG can securely generate random shares
against adversary who can compromise at most P − 1 TPUs,
assuming the semantic security of the PCDD cryptosystem.
Proof. For each TPU i (0 ≤ i < P), only the PCDD
encryption [[r(1)]], · · · , [[r(ℓ)]] are sent to TPU i + 1. After
that, PCDD encryption [[r]] is sent from TPU i + 1 to i.
According to semantically secure of the PCDD (theorem
3), the TPU i + 1 cannot get any information from the
ciphertext sent from TPU i. Even the adversary can
compromise at most P − 1 TPUs and get the shares
r
(1)
i , · · · , r
(ℓ)
i , ri, (s)he cannot get the secret r
(1), · · · , r(ℓ), r
due to r
(1)
P , · · · , r
(ℓ)
P , rP are unknown to adversary accord-
ing to the security of Theorem 1.
The security proof of the secure share domain trans-
formation in section, secure binary shares operation in
section, secure integer computation, and secure FPN
computation are similar to the proof of theorem 4. The
security of above operations are based on the semantic
security of the PCDD cryptosystem. Next, we will show
that AHP and PIR can achieve its corresponding func-
tionality.
Theorem 5. The AHP can securely achieve the access pattern
hidden for the function input under the semantic security of
the PCDD cryptosystem.
Proof. In the select share phase, all a1, · · · , aH are se-
lected and encrypted by RU, and are sent to TPUs for
processing. It is impossible for the adversary to know the
plaintext of the ciphertext due to the semantic security
of PCDD. Also, the shares are dynamically update by
computing b∗i ← bi+δ1,i+δ2,i+ · · ·+δP,i mod N . As δj,i
is randomly generated by TPU i and is sent from TPU j
to TPU i, it is hard for the adversary to recover bi even
adversary compromise the other P − 1 TPUs due to the
secrecy of Theorem 2. Thus, it is still impossible for the
adversary to trace the original shares with the update
shares which can achieve the access pattern hidden.
Theorem 6. The PIR can securely achieve the private in-
formation retrieve under the semantic security of the PCDD
cryptosystem.
Proof. In PIR, all a1, · · · , aH are selected and encrypted
by RU, and sent to TPUs for processing. After that, [[b∗]]
is transmitted among TPUs. As all the computations
in the PIR are executed in the ciphertext domain, it is
impossible for the adversary to know the plaintext of the
ciphertext due to the semantic security of PCDD, which
can achieve the private information retrieve.
7.3 Security of LightCom
Theorem 7. The LightCom is secure against side-channel
attack if tc + tp + td < P · ta, where tc, tp and td are the
runtime of secure computation GenCpt, private key update,
and data share update, respectively; ta is the runtime for
attacker successfully compromising the TPU enclave; P is the
number of TPUs in the system.
Proof. In the data upload phase, RU’s data are randomly
separated and uploaded to TPUs via secure channel.
According to theorem 1, no useful information about
the RU’s data are leaked to the adversary with compro-
mising P − 1 TPUs encalves. For the long-term storage,
the data shares are securely sealed in the UnS with
PCDD crypto-system. With the theorem 3, we can find
the encrypted data shares are semantically secure stored
in the UnS.
In the secure online computing phase, all the cipher-
text are securely load to the TPUs with UnSeal. Then, all
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the TPUs jointly achieves the secure computation with
the GenCpt. During the computing phase, the system
attacker can launch the following three types of attacks:
1) compromise the TPU enclave: adversary can compromise
a TPU enclave to get current data shares and private
key shares with the time ta; 2) stores the old private key
shares: the adversary tries to recover the RU’s private
key with current and old private key shares. 3) stores the
old data shares and try to recover the RU’s original data: the
adversary tries to recover the RU’s data with current and
old data shares. To prevent first type of attack, RU’s data
are separated and distributed among P TPUs. Unless
adversary can compromise all the TPU enclaves at the
same time, A can get nothing useful information from
compromised shares according to theorem 1. Thanks to
the secrecy property of proactive additive secret sharing
scheme in Theorem 2, it is impossible for the adversary
to recover the private key and RU’s data by getting
P−1 TPUs at each time period. As the TPU enclaves are
dynamically release after the computation, the attacker
needs to restart to compromise the TPU enclaves after
the enclaves are built for secure computation.
Thus, the adversary fails to attack our LightCom
system if the data shares are successfully seals in the
UnS and all the TPU enclaves are released before the
adversary compromises all the enclaves in the secure
computation phase. In this case, the LightCom is secure
against adversary side-channel attack if tc + tp + td <
P · ta.
8 EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Light-
Com.
8.1 Experiment Analysis
For evaluating the performance of the LightCom, we
build the framework with C code under the Intelr
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) environment as a spe-
cial case of TPU, and the experiments are performed
on a personal computer (PC) with 3.6 GHz single-core
processor and 1 GB RAM memory (single-thread pro-
gram are used) on virtual machine with Linux operation
system. To test the efficiency of our LightCom, there
are two types of metrics are considered, called runtime
and security level (associate with PCDD parameter N ).
The runtime refers to the secure outsourced computa-
tion executing duration on server or user’s side in our
testbed. The security level is an indication of the security
strength of a cryptographic primitive. Moreover, we use
SHA-256 as the hash function H(·) in LightCom. As
the communication latency among CPUs is very low
(use Intelr UltraPath Interconnect (UPI) with 10.4 GT/s
transfer speed and theoretical bandwidth is 20.8 GB/s)14,
we do not consider the communication overhead as a
performance metric in our LightCom.
14. https://www.microway.com/knowledge-center-
articles/performance-characteristics-of-common-transports-buses/
8.1.1 Basic Crypto and System Primitive
We first evaluate the performance of our basic operation
of cryptographic primitive (PCDD cryptosystem) and ba-
sic system operations (Seal, UnSeal and SDD protocol).
We first let N be 1024 bits to achieve 80-bit security [10]
to test the basic crypto primitive and basic protocol. For
PCDD, it takes 1.153 ms to encrypt a message (Enc),
1.171 ms for Dec, 1.309 ms to run PDec, 5.209 µs to run
TDec. For the basic system operations, it takes 1.317 ms
for Seal, 1.523 ms for UnSeal, and 1.512 ms for SDD
(P = 3). Moreover, Seal, UnSeal and SDD are affected
by the PCDD parameter N and the number of TPUs P
(See Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) respectively). From the Figs.
3(a) and 3(b), we can that the parameter N will affect
greatly on the runtime and communication overhead of
the protocols.
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Fig. 3. Simulation results of Basic Protocols
8.1.2 Performance of TPU-based Integer Computation
Generally, there are four factors that affect the perfor-
mance of TPU-based integer computation: 1) the number
of TPUs P ; 2) the PCDD parameter N ; 3) the bit-length
of the integer ℓ; 4) the number of encrypted data H .
In Fig. 4(a)-4(e), we can see that the runtime of all the
protocols increase with P . It is because more runtime
are needed and more data in online phase and random
numbers in offline phase are required to process with
extra parties. Also, we can see that the runtime of all
the TPU-based integer computations increase with the
bit-length of N from Table 1. It is because the running
time of the basic operations (Enc and Dec algorithms
of PCDD) increases when N increases. Moreover, in Fig.
4(f)-4(k), the performance of RTG, SMM, BAdd, BExt, SEP,
SC, SEQ, Min2, MinH , UNI are associated with ℓ. The
computational cost of above protocols are increased with
ℓ, as more computation resources are needed to process
when ℓ increase. Finally, we can see that performance
of APH and PIR are increased with H in Fig. 4(l). It is
because more numbers of PCDD ciphertexts cost more
energy with the homomorphic and module exponential
operations.
8.1.3 Performance of TPU-based FPN Computation
For the basic TPU-based FPN computation, there are
four factors that affects performance of LightCom: 1) the
14
TABLE 1
Protocol Performance: A Comparative Summary (ℓ = 32, H = 8,P = 3, 100-time for average)
Online Computation Cost (Millisecond) Offline Computation Cost (Second)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
RTG 16.66 53.61 117.0 225.92 369.92 675.15 933.13 - - - - - - -
B2I 2.2 6.29 13.92 27.15 47.29 85.8 116.7 - - - - - - -
I2B 2.72 8.19 16.38 31.21 51.13 70.25 102.0 - - - - - - -
SBM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.024 0.047 0.076 0.139 0.192
BAdd 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.059 0.084 0.222 0.915 1.569 3.024 4.868 8.897 12.346
BExt 1.36 4.24 8.54 16.6 29.1 51.93 70.13 0.268 1.077 1.882 3.634 6.016 10.842 14.868
SM 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.031 0.066 0.128 0.228 0.387 0.530
SMM 0.140 0.215 0.248 0.356 0.457 0.46 0.614 0.305 1.006 2.114 4.108 7.313 12.396 16.965
SEP2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.028 0.056 0.103 0.171 0.232
SEP 2.73 5.95 10.79 19.44 34.84 53.8 74.08 9.867 32.739 68.414 132.96 236.28 400.87 548.76
SC 1.32 4.11 8.77 16.73 29.68 49.85 68.39 0.267 1.077 1.882 3.634 6.017 10.743 14.869
SEQ 2.59 8.06 16.96 32.84 54.17 98.8 139.1 0.535 2.155 3.764 7.269 12.034 21.486 29.378
Min2 3.37 9.26 20.34 38.14 66.58 97.9 145.4 0.286 1.141 2.015 3.891 6.474 11.517 15.929
MinH 3.75 68.89 150.85 294.49 510.82 869.74 1453.6 2.007 7.983 14.101 27.24 45.318 80.624 111.51
APH 4.955 15.12 33.29 63.58 117.79 191.25 228.5 - - - - - - -
PIR 0.926 2.492 5.057 9.28 16.6 26.6 31.67 - - - - - - -
UNI 44.58 119.03 247.27 460.56 810.9 1181.5 1686.9 81.016 270.14 561.94 1090.9 1937.4 3290.7 4505.8
number of TPUs; 2) the PCDD parameter N ; 3) the bit-
length of the integer ℓ; 4) the number of encrypted data
H . The runtime trends of FPN computation protocols
(e.g. FC, FEQ, FM, FMM, FMin2, FMinH ) are similar to the
trends of corresponding secure integer computation (e.g.
SC, SEQ, SM, SMM, Min2, MinH ), as the runtime of FPN
computation is equal to the runtime of corresponding
secure integer computation add the runtime of UNI.
8.2 Theoretical Analysis
Let us assume that one regular exponentiation operation
with an exponent of ‖N‖ requires 1.5 ‖N‖ multiplica-
tions [11]. For PCDD, it takes 3‖N‖ multiplications for
Enc, 1.5‖N‖ multiplications for Dec, 1.5‖N‖ multiplica-
tions for PDec, P multiplications for TDec, 1.5‖N‖ mul-
tiplications for CR. For the basic operation of LightCom,
it takes 1.5P‖N‖multiplications to run SDD, 3‖N‖+thash
multiplications for Seal, 1.5P‖N‖+thash multiplications
for UnSeal, O((ℓ + P)‖N‖) multiplications for RTG,
O(P‖N‖) multiplications for B2I, I2B. For the integer
and binary protocol in LightCom, it takes O(P‖N‖)mul-
tiplications for offline phase of SBM and SM, O(ℓP‖N‖)
multiplications for offline phase of BAdd, BExt, SC,
SEQ, Min2, O(ℓP‖N‖) multiplications for both offline
and online phase of SEP, O(HP‖N‖) multiplications
for offline phase of APH and PIR, O(⌈log2H⌉ · ℓP‖N‖)
multiplications for offline phase of MinH . For the FPN
computation in LightCom, it takesO(HℓP‖N‖)multipli-
cations for offline phase UNI and FAdd, O(ℓP‖N‖) mul-
tiplications for offline phase FM, FMM, FC, FEQ, FMin2,
and O(⌈log2H⌉·ℓP‖N‖)multiplications for offline phase
of FMinH . All the above protocols only need O(1) mul-
tiplications in online phase, which is greatly fit for fast
processing.
9 RELATED WORK
Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic encryption, al-
low third-party to do the computation on the ciphertext
which reflected on the plaintext, is considered as the best
solution to achieve the secure outsourced computation.
The first construction of fully homomorphic encryp-
tion was proposed by Gentry in 2009 under the ideal
lattices, which permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits
over the plaintext [12]. Later, some of the new hard
problems (such as Learning With Errors (LWE) [13],
Ring-LWE [14]) are used to construct the FHE which
can greatly reduce the storage overhead and increase
the performance of the homomorphic operations [15],
[16]. However, the current FHE solutions and libraries
are still not practical enough for the real real-world
scenarios [17], [18]. Somewhat homomorphic encryption
[19], [20] can allow semi-honest third-party to achieve
the arbitrary circuits with limited depth. The limited
times of homomorphic operations are restrict the usage
scope of the application. Semi-homomorphic encryption
(SHE) can only support additive [21] (or multiplicative
[22]) homomorphic operation. However, with the help
of the extra semi-honest computation-aid server, a new
computation framework can be constructed to achieve
commonly-used secure rational number computation
[23], secure multiple keys computation [24], and floating-
point number computation [25]. The new framework
can greatly balance the security and efficiency concerns,
however, the extra server will still complex the system
which brings more risk of information leakage.
Secret Sharing-based Computation. The user’s data in
secret sharing-based (SS-based) computation are sepa-
rated into multiple shares with the secret sharing tech-
nique, and each shares are located in one server to
guarantee the security. Multiple parties can jointly to-
gether to securely achieve a computation without leak-
ing the original data to the adversary. Different from
the heavyweight homomorphic operation, the SS-based
computation [26], [27], [28] can achieve the lightweight
computation. Despite the theoretical construction, many
real-word computation are constructed for practical us-
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Fig. 4. Simulation results of LightCom
age, such as SS-based set intersection [29] and top-k
computation [30]. These basic computations can be used
to solve data security problem in data mining technique,
such as deep learning [31]. Emekc¸i et al. [32] proposed
a secure ID3 algorithm to construct a decision tree in a
privacy-preserving manner. Ma et al. [33] constructed a
lightweight privacy-preserving adaptive boosting (Ad-
aBoost) for the face recognition. The new secure natural
exponential and secure natural logarithm which can
securely achieve the corresponding computation compu-
tation to balance accuracy and efficiency. Although many
of the privacy-preserving data mining techniques with
secret sharing are constructed [34], [35], the SS-based
computation still need to build secure channel among
these parties. Moreover, the high communication rounds
among the computation parties still become an obstacle
for a large-scale application.
Intelr Software Guard Extensions. Intelr SGX is a kind
of TEE which provides strong hardware-enforced con-
fidentiality and integrity guarantees and protects an
application form the host OS, hypervisor, BIOS, and
other software. Although an increasingly number of
real-world industry applications are securely executed
in the untrusted remote platforms equipped with SGX,
the SGX still faces side-channel attack to expose the
information during the computation. Go¨tzfried et al. [36]
proposed a new attack called root-level cache-timing
attacks which can obtain secret information from an
Intelr SGX enclave. Lee et al. [37] gave a new side-
channel attack cannled branch shadowing which reveals
fine-grained control flows in a SGX enclave. Bulck et al.
[38] constructed two novel attack vectors that infer en-
claved memory accesses. Chen et al. [39] presented a new
attack call SGXPECTRE that can learn secrets inside the
enclave memory or its internal registers. Currently, three
types of solutions are used to protect the side-channel
attack: hardware method [40], [41], system method [42],
[43], and application method [44], [45]. These methods
can only guarantee some dimension of protection, and
cannot be used for all-directional protection even against
the unknown side-channel attack.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed LightCom, a framework
for practical privacy-preserving outsourced computation
framework, which allowed a user to outsource encrypted
data to a single cloud service provider for securely data
storage and process. We designed two types of out-
sourced computation toolkits which can securely guaran-
tee the achieve secure integer computation and floating-
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TABLE 2
Comprehensive Comparison with the existing works
Function/Algorithm [23] [7] [25] [24] [46] [16] [14] [29]
Method PHE PHE PHE PHE PHE FHE FHE OT+SS
User-side Non-interactive X X X X × X X ×
Communication Round (User) 1 1 1 1 O(1) 1 1 O(n)
Against Side-channel Attack X X X X X X X X
Data Storage Server One One One One One One One One
Minimum Number of Servers Multiple Two Two Two Two One One One
Function Type Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Linearly Intersection
Multiple Data Format X × X × × × × ×
Without Non-colluded Servers × × × × × X X X
Without TTP × × × × X × × X
Support Multiple Keys × X × X × X × ×
Server-Side Overhead Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle High High Middle
Function/Algorithm [30] [32] [31] [33] [47] [48] [49] Our
Method SS SS SS SS TEE TEE TEE TEE+SS+PHE
User-side Non-interactive × × X X X X X X
Communication Round (User) O(kn2) O(n) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Against Side-channel Attack X X X X × × X X
Data Storage Server Multiple Multiple Two Two One One One One
Minimum Number of Servers Multiple Two Two Two One One One One
Function Type Top-k Addition Specific Adaboost Matrix Specific Specific Generic & Specific
Multiple Data Format × × × × × × × X
Without Non-colluded Servers × × × × × X X X
Without TTP X X × × X X X X
Support Multiple Keys X X X X × × × X
Server-Side Overhead Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Note: In the table, ‘PHE’ is short for ‘Partially Homomorphic Encryption’, ‘OT’ is short for ‘Oblivious Transfer’,
‘SS’ is short for ‘Secret Sharing’, TEE is short for ’Trusted Execution Environment’.
point computation against side-channel attack. The util-
ity and performance of our LightCom framework was
then demonstrated using simulations. Compared with
the existing secure outsourced computation framework,
our LightCom takes fast, scalable, and secure outsourced
data processing into account.
As a future research effort, we plan to apply our
LightCom in a specific applications, such as e-health
cloud system. It allows us to refine the framework to
handle more complex real-world computations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work is supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant No.61702105, No.61872091).
REFERENCES
[1] D. V. Dimitrov, “Medical internet of things and big data in
healthcare,” Healthcare informatics research, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 156–
163, 2016.
[2] M. Naehrig, K. Lauter, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Can homomor-
phic encryption be practical?” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM
workshop on Cloud computing security workshop. ACM, 2011, pp.
113–124.
[3] M. Van Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Fully
homomorphic encryption over the integers,” in Annual Interna-
tional Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques. Springer, 2010, pp. 24–43.
[4] X. Liu, R. Deng, K.-K. R. Choo, Y. Yang, and H. Pang, “Privacy-
preserving outsourced calculation toolkit in the cloud,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018.
[5] R. Bendlin, I. Damga˚rd, C. Orlandi, and S. Zakarias, “Semi-
homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation,” in An-
nual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryp-
tographic Techniques. Springer, 2011, pp. 169–188.
[6] F. Farokhi, I. Shames, and N. Batterham, “Secure and private
cloud-based control using semi-homomorphic encryption,” IFAC-
PapersOnLine, vol. 49, no. 22, pp. 163–168, 2016.
[7] X. Liu, R. H. Deng, K.-K. R. Choo, and J. Weng, “An efficient
privacy-preserving outsourced calculation toolkit with multiple
keys,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 11, no. 11, pp. 2401–2414, 2016.
[8] U. Consortium et al., The Unicode Standard, Version 2.0. Addison-
Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., 1997.
[9] E. Bresson, D. Catalano, and D. Pointcheval, “A simple public-key
cryptosystem with a double trapdoor decryption mechanism and
its applications,” in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2003, 9th
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology
and Information Security, Taipei, Taiwan, November 30 - December 4,
2003, Proceedings, 2003, pp. 37–54.
[10] E. Barker, W. Barker, W. Burr, W. Polk, and M. Smid, “NIST special
publication 800-57,” NIST Special Publication, vol. 800, no. 57, pp.
1–142, 2007.
[11] D. E. Knuth, Art of computer programming, volume 2: Seminumerical
algorithms. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2014.
[12] C. Gentry et al., “Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal
lattices.” in Stoc, vol. 9, no. 2009, 2009, pp. 169–178.
[13] Z. Brakerski and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Efficient fully homomorphic
encryption from (standard) lwe,” SIAM Journal on Computing,
vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 831–871, 2014.
[14] Z. Brakerski, C. Gentry, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “(leveled) fully
homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping,” ACM Transac-
tions on Computation Theory (TOCT), vol. 6, no. 3, p. 13, 2014.
[15] I. Chillotti, N. Gama, M. Georgieva, and M. Izabachene, “Faster
fully homomorphic encryption: Bootstrapping in less than 0.1
seconds,” in International Conference on the Theory and Application
of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer, 2016, pp. 3–33.
[16] X. Liu, R. Deng, K.-K. R. Choo, Y. Yang, and H. Pang, “Privacy-
preserving outsourced calculation toolkit in the cloud,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018.
[17] Y. Doro¨z, E. O¨ztu¨rk, and B. Sunar, “Accelerating fully homomor-
phic encryption in hardware,” IEEE Transactions on Computers,
vol. 64, no. 6, pp. 1509–1521, 2015.
[18] X. Liu, R. Deng, K.-K. R. Choo, and Y. Yang, “Privacy-preserving
outsourced clinical decision support system in the cloud,” IEEE
Transactions on Services Computing, 2017.
[19] I. Damga˚rd, V. Pastro, N. Smart, and S. Zakarias, “Multiparty
computation from somewhat homomorphic encryption,” in An-
nual Cryptology Conference. Springer, 2012, pp. 643–662.
[20] J. Fan and F. Vercauteren, “Somewhat practical fully homomor-
phic encryption.” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2012, p. 144,
2012.
17
[21] P. Paillier, “Public-key cryptosystems based on composite de-
gree residuosity classes,” in Advances in cryptologyEUROCRYPT99.
Springer, 1999, pp. 223–238.
[22] T. E. Gamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme
based on discrete logarithms,” vol. 31, no. 4, 1985, pp. 469–472.
[23] X. Liu, K.-K. R. Choo, R. H. Deng, R. Lu, and J. Weng, “Effi-
cient and privacy-preserving outsourced calculation of rational
numbers,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 27–39, 2018.
[24] A. Peter, E. Tews, and S. Katzenbeisser, “Efficiently outsourcing
multiparty computation under multiple keys,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 2046–2058,
2013.
[25] X. Liu, R. H. Deng, W. Ding, R. Lu, and B. Qin, “Privacy-
preserving outsourced calculation on floating point numbers,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11,
no. 11, pp. 2513–2527, 2016.
[26] R. Cramer, I. Damga˚rd, and U. Maurer, “General secure multi-
party computation from any linear secret-sharing scheme,” in In-
ternational Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques. Springer, 2000, pp. 316–334.
[27] H. Chen and R. Cramer, “Algebraic geometric secret sharing
schemes and secure multi-party computations over small fields,”
in Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 2006, pp.
521–536.
[28] K. Chida, D. Genkin, K. Hamada, D. Ikarashi, R. Kikuchi, Y. Lin-
dell, and A. Nof, “Fast large-scale honest-majority mpc for ma-
licious adversaries,” in Annual International Cryptology Conference.
Springer, 2018, pp. 34–64.
[29] C. Dong, L. Chen, and Z. Wen, “When private set intersection
meets big data: an efficient and scalable protocol,” in Proceedings
of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications
security. ACM, 2013, pp. 789–800.
[30] M. Burkhart and X. Dimitropoulos, “Fast privacy-preserving top-
k queries using secret sharing,” in 2010 Proceedings of 19th Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Communications and Networks. IEEE,
2010, pp. 1–7.
[31] K. Huang, X. Liu, S. Fu, D. Guo, and M. Xu, “A lightweight
privacy-preserving cnn feature extraction framework for mobile
sensing,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
2019.
[32] F. Emekc¸i, O. D. Sahin, D. Agrawal, and A. El Abbadi, “Privacy
preserving decision tree learning over multiple parties,” Data &
Knowledge Engineering, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 348–361, 2007.
[33] Z. Ma, Y. Liu, X. Liu, J. Ma, and K. Ren, “Lightweight privacy-
preserving ensemble classification for face recognition,” IEEE
Internet of Things Journal, pp. 1–1, 2019.
[34] X. Ge, L. Yan, J. Zhu, and W. Shi, “Privacy-preserving distributed
association rule mining based on the secret sharing technique,” in
The 2nd International Conference on Software Engineering and Data
Mining. IEEE, 2010, pp. 345–350.
[35] Z. Gheid and Y. Challal, “Efficient and privacy-preserving k-
means clustering for big data mining,” in 2016 IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ISPA. IEEE, 2016, pp. 791–798.
[36] J. Go¨tzfried, M. Eckert, S. Schinzel, and T. Mu¨ller, “Cache attacks
on intel sgx,” in Proceedings of the 10th European Workshop on
Systems Security. ACM, 2017, p. 2.
[37] S. Lee, M.-W. Shih, P. Gera, T. Kim, H. Kim, and M. Peinado,
“Inferring fine-grained control flow inside {SGX} enclaves with
branch shadowing,” in 26th {USENIX} Security Symposium
({USENIX} Security 17), 2017, pp. 557–574.
[38] J. Van Bulck, N. Weichbrodt, R. Kapitza, F. Piessens, and
R. Strackx, “Telling your secrets without page faults: Stealthy page
table-based attacks on enclaved execution,” in 26th {USENIX}
Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 17), 2017, pp. 1041–1056.
[39] G. Chen, S. Chen, Y. Xiao, Y. Zhang, Z. Lin, and T. H. Lai, “Sgx-
pectre attacks: Leaking enclave secrets via speculative execution,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.09085, 2018.
[40] L. Domnitser, A. Jaleel, J. Loew, N. Abu-Ghazaleh, and D. Pono-
marev, “Non-monopolizable caches: Low-complexity mitigation
of cache side channel attacks,” ACM Transactions on Architecture
and Code Optimization (TACO), vol. 8, no. 4, p. 35, 2012.
[41] V. Costan, I. Lebedev, and S. Devadas, “Sanctum: Minimal hard-
ware extensions for strong software isolation,” in 25th {USENIX}
Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 16), 2016, pp. 857–874.
[42] F. Liu, Q. Ge, Y. Yarom, F. Mckeen, C. Rozas, G. Heiser, and R. B.
Lee, “Catalyst: Defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in
cloud computing,” in 2016 IEEE international symposium on high
performance computer architecture (HPCA). IEEE, 2016, pp. 406–
418.
[43] Z. Zhou, M. K. Reiter, and Y. Zhang, “A software approach to
defeating side channels in last-level caches,” in Proceedings of the
2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 871–882.
[44] B. Coppens, I. Verbauwhede, K. De Bosschere, and B. De Sutter,
“Practical mitigations for timing-based side-channel attacks on
modern x86 processors,” in 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy. IEEE, 2009, pp. 45–60.
[45] M.-W. Shih, S. Lee, T. Kim, and M. Peinado, “T-sgx: Eradicating
controlled-channel attacks against enclave programs.” in NDSS,
2017.
[46] B. K. Samanthula, Y. Elmehdwi, andW. Jiang, “K-nearest neighbor
classification over semantically secure encrypted relational data,”
IEEE transactions on Knowledge and data engineering, vol. 27, no. 5,
pp. 1261–1273, 2014.
[47] F. Shaon, M. Kantarcioglu, Z. Lin, and L. Khan, “Sgx-bigmatrix:
A practical encrypted data analytic framework with trusted pro-
cessors,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2017, pp. 1211–
1228.
[48] K. A. Ku¨c¸u¨k, A. Paverd, A. Martin, N. Asokan, A. Simpson, and
R. Ankele, “Exploring the use of intel sgx for secure many-party
applications,” in Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on System Software
for Trusted Execution. ACM, 2016, p. 5.
[49] S. Chandra, V. Karande, Z. Lin, L. Khan, M. Kantarcioglu, and
B. Thuraisingham, “Securing data analytics on sgx with random-
ization,” in European Symposium on Research in Computer Security.
Springer, 2017, pp. 352–369.
Ximeng Liu (S’13-M’16) received the B.Sc. de-
gree in electronic engineering from Xidian Uni-
versity, Xian, China, in 2010 and the Ph.D.
degree in Cryptography from Xidian University,
China, in 2015. Now he is the full professor in the
College of Mathematics and Computer Science,
Fuzhou University. Also, he is a research fellow
at the School of Information System, Singa-
pore Management University, Singapore. He has
published more than 100 papers on the topics
of cloud security and big data securityincluding
papers in IEEE Transactions on Computers, IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Informatics, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, IEEE Transactions on Service Computing, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal, and so on. He awards Minjiang Scholars Distinguished
Professor, Qishan Scholars in Fuzhou University, and ACM SIGSAC
China Rising Star Award (2018). His research interests include cloud
security, applied cryptography and big data security. He is a member of
the IEEE, ACM, CCF.
Robert H. Deng (F’16) is AXA Chair Professor
of Cybersecurity and Professor of Information
Systems in the School of Information Systems,
Singapore Management University since 2004.
Prior to this, he was a principal scientist and
a manager of Infocomm Security Department,
Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore. His
research interests include data security and pri-
vacy, multimedia security, network and system
security. He served/is serving on the editorial
boards of many international journals, including
the IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, and IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing.
18
Pengfei Wu received the B.Sc. degree in soft-
ware engineering from Shandong University, Ji-
nan, China, in 2016. He is currently pursuing the
Ph.D. degree of Software Engineering in Peking
University, Beijing, China. His research interests
include cloud security and big data security.
Yang Yang (M’17) received the B.Sc. degree
from Xidian University, Xi’an, China, in 2006
and Ph.D. degrees from Xidian University, China,
in 2012. She is a research fellow (postdoctor)
under supervisor Robert H. Deng in School of In-
formation System, Singapore Management Uni-
versity. She is also an associate professor in the
college of mathematics and computer science,
Fuzhou University. Her research interests are
in the area of information security and privacy
protection.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
A. Deterministic Turing Machines
Turing machines are a model of computation which
anything can be computed that can be computed by
a Turing Machine. As all the function in our PVOA
framework can be computed by Deterministic Turing
Machine. The rigorous definition is defined as follows
Definition 2 (Deterministic Turing Machine). A Deter-
ministic Turing Machine contains a tuple (Q,Σ, δ, s, h) where
1) Q is a finite set of states which contains the states
s, qacc, qrej . 2) Σ is a finite alphabet which contains the
symbol #. 3) Transition function δ : Q − {qacc, qrej} × Σ →
Q × Σ ∪ {R,L}, where L is left shift, R is right shift. 4)
s ∈ Q is the start state, qacc is the accept state, qrej is the
reject state.
Suppose M is a deterministic Turing machine that
halts on all inputs. Time complexity function TM : N→ N
is defined as
TM (n) = max{m|∃w ∈ Σ
∗, |w| = n
such that the computation of M on w takes m moves},
where numbers are coded in binary format. We call a
Turing machine is polynomial if there exists a polynomial
p(n), such that TM (n) ≤ p(n), for all n ∈ N.
B. Hard Problem
Assumption 1. (DDH assumption over Z∗N2 [9]). For every
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists a
negligible function negl(·) such that for sufficiently large l.
Pr


A(N,X, Y,
Zb mod N)
= b
:
pp← Sys(l/2)
N = pq, g ← G
x, y, z ← [1, ord(G)]
X = gx mod N2
Y = gy mod N2
Z0 = g
z mod N2
Z1 = g
xy mod N2
b← {0, 1}


−
1
2
= negl(l).
Theorem 8. Let N be a composite modulus product of two
large primes. Let G be the cyclic group of quadratic residues
modulo N2. The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem over Z∗
N2
(in G) cannot be harder than factoring.
Proof. The detailed proof can be found in [9].
C. Paillier Cryptosystem Distributed Decryption
(PCDD)
In order to realize LightCom, our previous Paillier Cryp-
tosystem Distributed Decryption (PCDD) [23] cryptosys-
tem is used and works as follows:
KeyGen: Given a security parameter k and two large
prime numbers p, q, where L(p) = L(q) = k, we have
two strong primes p′, q′, s.t., p′ = p−12 and q
′ = q−12 (due
to the property of the strong primes). We then compute
N = pq and λ = lcm(p−1, q−1), define a function L(x) =
x−1
N
, and choose a generator g of order (p− 1)(q − 1)/2.
The public key is pk = (N, g), and the corresponding
private key is sk = λ.
Encryption (Enc): Input a message m ∈ ZN , the
Enc chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗N2 , and output
ciphertext as [[m]] = gmrN mod N2.
Decryption (Dec): Input a ciphertext [[m]] ∈ ZN2 and
the private key sk, the Dec compute [[m]]λ = (1 +mNλ)
mod N2. Since gcd(m,λ) = 1, the plaintext m can be
recovered as m = L([[m]]λ) · λ−1 mod N2.
Private Key Splitting (KeyS): Input the private key
λ, the KeyS separates λ into n shares as λ∗i such that
λ∗1 + · · ·+ λ
∗
n ≡ 0 mod λ and λ
∗
1 + · · ·+ λ
∗
n ≡ 1 mod N .
Partially decryption (PDec): Once [[m]] is received,
with partially private key λ∗i , the partially decrypted ci-
phertext CTi can be calculated as: CTi = [[m]]
λ∗i mod N2.
Threshold decryption (TDec): Once n decrypted ci-
phertexts CT1, · · · , CTn are received, the TDec algorithm
can calculates T =
∏n
i=1(CTi) mod N
2, and m = L(T
mod N2).
Given [[x1]], · · · , [[xn]] and a1, · · · , an, we show that our
PCDD have the polynomial homomorphism property
(Poly):
[[a1 · x1 + a2 · x2 + · · · anxn]]← [[x1]]a1 · [[x2]]a2 · · · [[xn]]an
Homomorphic Properties of DT-PKC: Here, we give
three homomorphic properties of DT-PKC as follows:
19
1) Additive homomorphism: Given ciphertexts [[m1]] and
[[m2]] under a same public key pk, the additive homo-
morphism can be achieved by ciphertext multiplication,
i.e., compute [[m1]]pk ·[[m2]]pk = {(1+(m1+m2)·N)·hr1+r2
mod N2, gr1+r2 mod N2} = [[m1 +m2]]pk .
2) Scalar-multiplicative Homomorphism: Given cipher-
texts [[m]]pk and a constant number c ∈ ZN , it
has ([[m]]pk)
c = {(1 + m · N)c · hcr1 mod N2, gcr1
mod N2} = [[cm]]pk. Specifically, let c = N + 1 and
we have ([[m]]pk)
N−1 = {(1 + (mN2 − mN) · h(N−1)r1
mod N2, g(N−1)r1 mod N2} = [[−m]]pk.
Without any ambiguity, all the ciphertexts below are
encrypted under the same public key pk, and we use the
notion [[x]] instead of [[x]]pk .
